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I.
INTRODUCTION
In Citizens United v. FEC,' the majority in the U.S. Supreme Court
purported to close the debate about corruption in campaign finance law. After
decades of debate, the Court decisively rejected a broad understanding of
corruption in favor of a narrow one, holding that only quid pro quo corruption
could justify campaign finance regulation that infringed on First Amendment
rights. 2
The decision was a bombshell. While some commentators had predicted that
the Court might continue to whittle away at Congressional power to pass laws
restricting corporate electoral activity, the case was decided on the broadest
possible grounds. It overturned thirty years of direct precedent and opened the
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 910.
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possibility that foreign entities might be able to spend money to influence
elections. 3
However, the Court in Citizens United left open a few opportunities for
greater exploration. Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion, heavily
emphasized the criminal nature of the sanctions against corporate political
speech.4 Yet, outside of criminal law, different tools could potentially be used to
discourage private companies from trying to use their wealth to influence public
bodies for private advantage. What if, instead, Congress limited the jurisdiction
of courts over certain contracts that it deems corrupt? What if, for example,
Congress did not criminalize independent corporate expenditures, but directed
courts not to enforce contracts related to independent expenditures? Similarly,
what if Congress did not try to limit certain kinds of lobbying through criminal
law, but simply refused to enforce contracts to lobby? 5
Public corruption is hardly a new phenomenon, and policymakers have long
struggled to find an effective mechanism to deter or punish corruption. While we
have recently tried to deal with public corruption through legislation aimed at
reducing its incidence, nineteenth century policymakers adopted a very different
tactic. In the nineteenth century, courts used contract law to discourage public
corruption by refusing to enforce contracts that they deemed corrupt. Just as they
would refuse to enforce contracts for prostitution, they would refuse to enforce
contracts between public servants and private entities that undermined the
integrity of representative government. In the most striking instance of this
practice, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce a contract to lobby
Congress, holding that it was a clearly corrupt practice and against the public
policy of the United States.6 Thus, contrary to Justice Kennedy's view in
Citizens United,7 cases that uphold limits on campaign spending are not outliers,
but rather are consistent with generations of cases that recognized the public
danger of money having too much influence in politics.
Citizens United's blanket prohibition on Congressional criminalization of
3. As importantly, the decision decreased the friction that had previously prevented
corporations from engaging in quasi-electoral work, and let nonprofit, 501(c)(4) organizations
funded by corporate sources to shield corporate electoral activity from scrutiny relax in their
pursuit of electoral impact. One of the greatest costs of the prior ban on campaign spending by
corporations was the energy spent on avoiding prosecution. By giving 501 (c)(4) organizations and
corporations the green light to engage in all noncoordinated political activity, it reduced the cost of
lawyers and the fear of being prosecuted.
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888, 889, 895, 896, 897, 908.
5. My argument was inspired in part by Deborah Hellman's ideas, which are reflected in her
Article in this volume. Professor Hellman examines the freedom of legislatures to limit the sale of
items that it cannot ban outright. See Deborah Hellman, Money & Rights, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 528 (2011). In contrast, I examine the possibility that legislatures could limit the
enforcement of contracts that it may not ban outright.
6. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874).
7. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899-903 (concluding that Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the Court's broad view of corruption in that case was an
outlier).
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corporate spending requires us to think more imaginatively. If we take
Kennedy's repeated reference to criminal liability seriously, we might fruitfully
explore ways to revive the use of judicial nonenforcement of contracts to
discourage corruption in our electoral system. The ad hoc nineteenth century
practice of refusing to enforce contracts to sell public obligations provides an
intriguing possibility for exploration. These ideas involve real difficulties, and I
explore the likely objections in the body of the Article. What is most appealing
about nineteenth century courts' approach to corruption is that it offers the
possibility to move the debate outside the framework of criminal law and instead
wield the power of civil law to dissuade behavior that distorts democratic self-
governance. My goal is to spark discussion and open the range of options
available to Congress-and, in doing so, to continue in a larger project of
exploring the relationship between courts and public corruption.
This Article introduces some of these nineteenth century practices regarding
corruption and suggests that they might shed light on new ways to think about
dealing with money and politics after Citizens United. It is not intended as a
comprehensive review, but as a provocative exploration of a vastly different way
of thinking about courts and corruption. This Article's primary goal is
descriptive. It illustrates that, even prior to modern statutory campaign finance
law, courts would use their power to refuse to enforce contracts to limit the
power of money in the political sphere. In doing so, this description augments
Justice Stevens' dissenting argument in Citizens United that courts should give
great weight to corruption concerns.8
Part I briefly outlines Citizens United, with an emphasis on how the Court
addresses corruption and the case's focus on criminal liability. Part II outlines
the scope of the private law of corruption as it existed in the nineteenth century
and features three cases exemplifying the use of private law to limit corruption.
In Part III, I attempt to connect the nineteenth century model to the modern
puzzle of campaign finance law, arguing that private law has the advantage of
discouraging political behavior while not prohibiting it, potentially avoiding
some of the First Amendment concerns raised by modern campaign finance
legislation. Ultimately, I hope that the different way that nineteenth century
courts dealt with political corruption is so striking that it ignites the imaginations
of scholars and politicians struggling with ways to limit government capture.
II.
THE CRIMINAL Focus IN CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the
definition of public corruption-and, with it, narrowed the ability of the
government to take affirmative steps to remedy that corruption. Prior to Citizens
United, the Court had recognized that laws limiting corporate political spending
8. Id. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could be upheld if they were aimed at preventing the "distorting effects" that
occur when organizations with amassed wealth exercise undue influence over the
political sphere. 9 Writing for the majority in Citizens United, Kennedy redefined
corruption as limited only to "quid pro quo corruption"10 and held that the
government could not punish expression protected by the First Amendment with
criminal sanctions because of concerns about the distorting effects of that
speech.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down § 441b of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002,11 a federal law that prohibited corporations and
unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate. The Court held that Congress cannot ban independent
corporate efforts to influence the outcome of elections. 12 The decision rested on
two connected determinations. First, the Court found that the First Amendment
protects political speech regardless of the identity of the speaker.13 Second, the
Court found that no sufficiently important countervailing governmental or
constitutional goal is served by limits on corporate political advertising.14
According to the majority, independent expenditure limits do not cause
corruption or the appearance of corruption. 15 Since the majority recognized
corruption as the only possible government interest that is sufficiently
compelling to permit First Amendment restrictions, its finding that the spending
limits at issue do not dissuade corruption was conclusive. 16
For our purposes, two features are salient: Kennedy's definition of
corruption and his focus on the criminal law liability that burdens the First
Amendment free speech rights.
The centerpiece of Kennedy's opinion, albeit an unsatisfying and vague
centerpiece, was a description of the constitutionally important meaning of
"corruption."' 7 Kennedy framed the case as a choice between two inconsistent
precedents: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,18 which held that a state
could not limit a corporation's political speech, and Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce,19 which held that, because of the disproportionate aggregated
9. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (expressing
concerns about corporate political spending that is not correlated to public support for a
corporation's political position).
10. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10.
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
12. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
13. Id. at 905.
14. Id. at 909-11.
15. Id. at 909.
16. Id at 908-09.
17. Id at 909-10.
18. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
19. 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
l~garddvitlPhniiimof)Ntl.Neek Uni-verskyWSiDiabChtfi9gv
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wealth of corporations, the state could limit their political activity. 20 According
to Kennedy, Buckley and most of its progeny concluded that corruption is only
quid pro quo corruption. The unique influence over or access to politicians that
contributors can gain by making independent expenditures is not corruption. 21
Instead, Kennedy argued that politicians always favor certain policies and
naturally will prefer contributors and voters who believe in similar policies. 22 He
explained that the desire to use money to influence policy was a "substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason ... to make a contribution to ... one
candidate over another. . . ."23 As such, Austin, with its broad view of
corruption, was an outlier,24 and he explicitly overturned it.25
While undoubtedly narrow-or, as Stevens put it, "crabbed" 26-Kennedy's
definition of corruption was also imprecise. He did not set out the elements of
quid pro quo corruption. Kennedy's implicit image of quid pro quo corruption is
that of a constituent handing a politician, instead of a candidate, cash in direct
exchange for a vote; anything short of that does not appear to fall within his
bounds. Yet Kennedy's description of a corporation making a contribution to a
politician's campaign in exchange for influence over policy also arguably falls
within a definition of quid pro quo corruption. The mere invocation of the phrase
"quid pro quo" thus does not, as Kennedy seems to suggest, finally settle the
question of what corruption means-the quid and quo are still up for grabs. Is
the trade of a vote by one candidate for the vote of another candidate a quid pro
quo? On its face, yes-but it is standard political practice, horse-trading. Is the
trade of an hour of a Congressperson's time for a phone call to several friends a
quid pro quo? Again, both are items of value, but an agreement by a staffer "if I
set up this meeting, you need to call ten people about this," is routine. There are
thousands of such examples. The scope of quid pro quo is defined in terms of
social and legal practice, not as a matter of easily circumscribed logic.
At the same time, throughout the majority opinion, Kennedy repeatedly
emphasized that the campaign finance laws at issue in the case imposed criminal
liability. The use of the word "criminal" of course does not alone show that
Kennedy is relying on the "criminal" aspects of the law; his emphasis is revealed
more in the placement of the criminal law rhetoric. In the section explaining
Kennedy's views on the First Amendment, he describes the law as "an outright
ban, backed by criminal sanctions." 27 He continues:
Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations-including nonprofit
20. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
21. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
22. Id. (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
23. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297).
24. See Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REv.
581, 583, 596-97 (2011) (discussing Kennedy's view of corruption in jurisprudence).
25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
26. Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 897.
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advocacy corporations-either to expressly advocate the election or
defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications
within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election.
Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under § 441b: The Sierra
Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general
election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who
favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association
publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the
incumbent U.S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American
Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a
Presidential candidate in light of that candidate's defense of free speech.
These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship. 28
The image Kennedy attempted to create by the repeated use of the word "felony"
is clearly the fear of criminal law. He repeatedly referred to the "criminal
liability" and "criminal penalties" created by the law.29 He stressed that the law
subjected speakers to criminal sanctions and discussed the chilling effects of
costly litigation. 30 The most emphatic discussion of criminal liability arises
when Kennedy writes about the First Amendment. He explains that, "[w]hen
Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command
where a person may get his or her information. . . , it uses censorship to control
thought. This is unlawful."31 While Kennedy did not say that noncriminal
sanctions might survive, the repeated emphasis on the criminal law at issue at
least raises questions about how important jail time and criminal liability might
be to the existing majority.
III.
THE CORRUPT QUARTERMASTER, THE LOBBYIST, AND THE POSTMASTER
In contrast to Kennedy's view of corruption as limited to a quid pro quo that
triggers criminal sanctions, in the nineteenth century, courts dealt with
corruption in a radically different way. Instead of criminal law, contract law was
the grounds for much of the interaction between law and corruption. In 1909, an
Oklahoma court could say that:
Cases almost without number could be cited and quoted from which hold
that contracts . .. are not void because of the conclusion that corruption and
wrong-doing and undue influence would be the certain result thereof, but on
account of the recognition by them of corrupting tendencies of such
contracts. 32
There are hundreds of examples of courts throughout the nineteenth century
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 895, 897.
30. Id. at 895-97.
31. Id. at 908.
32. Hare v. Phaup 101 P. 1050, 1052 (Okla. 1909).
qngddvihlP~kmiiimof)N6.Neemk b1ivers&ySWdiabChfi9gv
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assuming a broader definition of corruption that encompassed undue influence.
One court described high contingent fees as "bribes," because "[t]he use of such
means and such agents will have the effect to subject state governments to the
combined capital of wealthy corporations, and produce universal corruption,
commencing with the representative and ending with the elector." 33 Courts
refused to enforce contracts that would "tend to corrupt or contaminate, by
improper influences, the integrity of our social or political institutions" because
"[l]egislators should act from high considerations of public duty." 34 Another
state court noted that the "law in its wisdom we think has a tendency to close the
door of temptation by refusing to recognize contracts which in any way hamper
the faithful discharge of the trust which the railroad company owes to the people
in the location of public conveniences." 35
It is beyond the scope of this Article to canvass all nineteenth century
contract law related to corruption. Instead, this Article introduces a handful of
cases that are notable because of their prominence at the time and how they
differ from the modem understanding of the judicial relationship to private
contracts involving public matters. In each case, a court refused to enforce an
otherwise legal contract because it concluded that the underlying bargain was
corrupt and the social implications of enforcement would be too great.
Enforcement would encourage people to try to manipulate government services
for private benefit, instead of for public benefit. It would lead to a culture in
which people saw government as a place to go to for special treatment and
favors, thereby undermining the integrity of the democratic culture. In the first
case, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce a contract that included in its
overall scheme an effort to corrupt a public official and defraud the
government. 36 In the second, the Court refused to enforce a contract to lobby on
behalf of an elderly gentleman. 37 In the third, an Indiana court refused to enforce
a contract to pay for help persuading a postmaster to locate a post office in a
particular building. 38 In the fourth-not a contract case-the U.S. Supreme
Court explained its understanding of the centrality of corruption. 39 Each case is
striking for its language, its understanding of the role of the courts, and its
interpretation of corruption.
A. Legal But Unenforceable Contracts
To make sense of corruption in contract law in the nineteenth century, it
33. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 335 (1853).
34. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co. v. Critchfield, 62 Ill. App. 221, 222 (1895). In that case,
the Court found that a road paving contract calculated to influence legislative action to permit such
paving was unenforceable as against public policy; no proof of illegality was required. Id.
35. McGuffin v. Coyle & Guss, 85 P. 954, 959 (Okla. 1906).
36. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. 184 (1830).
37. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874).
38. Elkhart Cnty. Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 241-42 (Ind. 1884).
39. Ex Parte Yarbough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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might be useful to examine the current state of public policy contract law. Courts
have some latitude to refuse to enforce contracts that violate societal norms. This
doctrine is often divided into three parts, allowing courts to refuse to enforce
contracts that are: 1) against public policy, 2) unconscionable, or 3) illegal.40
Courts refuse to enforce contracts for illegal activity, such as a contract for
gambling that is against the law in the jurisdiction, and, in certain circumstances,
they refuse to enforce contracts that are unconscionable-i.e., where the terms
are excessively unfair to one party. 4 1 However, modem courts rarely invoke the
public policy exception unless the conduct in question is illegal.42 In modem
law, almost all of the cases where a contract was invalidated involved either
attorney fee-splitting agreements or contracts that would violate existing statutes
or regulations. 43 For example, a court might not enforce a contract to recover
private gambling debts. 44 The prominent exception, which has not been followed
widely, is In re Baby M, where the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce
a contract between would-be parents and a surrogate mother. 45
The public policy exception was not always so thin. There was at the time a
more broad application of the public policy exception in the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries. Courts developed a body of cases that used the public
policy exception as a freestanding reason not to enforce contracts. nineteenth
century courts were "frequently willing to subordinate freedom of contract, or at
least some types of freedom of contract, to other social concerns." 46 A variety of
public policies, including protection of contracting parties and protection of
personal morality and the family, were used as grounds to invalidate certain
contracts. 47 Courts refused to enforce contracts in restraint of trade, contracts for
gambling, and contracts around sexual or family relationships (prostitution and
marriage).48 While modem courts might be more likely to closely scrutinize the
40. See, e.g., Eraser Co. v. Kaufiman, 138 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-51 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (stating that
contracts "are not presumptively invalid and will be enforced in the absence of proof that they are
unconscionable, inequitable, or in contravention of public policy"); Rivero v. Rivero, 216 P.3d
213, 227-28 (Nev. 2009) (same).
41. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (holding that a prohibition
against class arbitrations in a consumer adhesion contract was unconscionable).
42. See, e.g., Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 P.3d 812, 816 (Idaho 2011) ("Public
policy may be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution.").
43. Cf 1 Williston on Contracts, § 12:1 (4th ed. 2011) (listing cases in which contracts were
held illegal).
44. See id. (citing Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Travelers Exp. Co., 745 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.
Mich. 1990)).
45. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
46. Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall, " 79 B.U. L.
REv. 263, 325 (1999). Pettit notes that it is impossible to make absolute claims about diverse
courts in a brief period of time, but argues that some generalizations may be made about the
willingness of courts in the Nineteenth Century to use public policy in ways that are currently out
of practice. Id. at 290.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 300-30.
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fairness of the particular contract as between the two parties,49 nineteenth
century courts were more willing to scrutinize the contract's impact more
broadly and its possible effect on the relationship between the society and
citizens. 50
One type of uneforceable contract that nineteenth century courts recognized
was a contract that fundamentally corrupted representative government. If one
does a search for "corruption" in nineteenth century state and local cases, a
substantial proportion of the results will be found in contract cases.51 In this
category of cases, the courts refused to enforce contracts that subverted the
public good for private gain in public affairs. As an Indiana Court explained: "A
wholesome rule of law is that parties should not be permitted to make contracts
which are likely to set private interests in opposition to public duty or to the
public welfare." 52 As these cases make clear, one of the jobs of the courts was to
protect against private interests corrupting public offices.
B. The Corrupt Quartermaster: Law Will Not Degrade Itself
In 1830, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted Bartle v. Nutt, a case involving
a falling out between two men after a government contract went awry.53 One of
the men, Marsteller, was the deputy quartermaster of the United States. 54 Part of
a quartermaster's job was to manage supplies for the military; it was a position
of public trust, because he was responsible for attempting to get the best price for
the supplies. He and two others, Bartle and Coleman, entered into an agreement
regarding a contract with the government to rebuild Fort Washington. 55 The
scope of the agreement constituted the dispute of the case. However, this much is
clear: Marsteller was to provide funds and materials, Bartle was to oversee the
contract, and all three would share in the profits of the contract. 56
While rebuilding Fort Washington, the threesome sent false reports of the
cost of the building to the government, which were noticed by officers of the
Treasury. 57 Because these false accounts were caught, the contract cost more to
execute than planned, and it was done at a loss. Bartle sued Coleman for the
costs he incurred, arguing that they had a contract to share profits and losses,
thus the losses must be shared. Bartle argued that the court should engage in
49. Id. at 295-97.
50. See generally id. (describing Nineteenth Century courts' approach to contract law).
51. Some of this is necessarily impressionistic. However, a Westlaw search for "corruption"
with "contract" from 1800 to 1900 recovers 1500 documents. A similar search without the word
"contract" uncovers 8357 cases; the same search with "contract" added reveals 3626 documents.
52. Elkhart Cnty. Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 241-42 (Ind. 1884).
53. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. 184 (1830).
54. Id. at 188.
55. Id. at 184-85.
56. Id. at 185.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Id.
14qngddvithlPnii.in.Mf)Ntl.NeRevink bniverskyWediabChfiilgv
6892011]
N Y U REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
the typical inquiries one might find in a case involving a partnership gone bad-
i.e., examining the scope of the arrangement, considering the writings back and
forth between the parties, and reviewing the accounting. 59 The administrator of
Coleman's estate, William D. Nutt, countersued for costs he incurred.60
The Supreme Court found that "[t]o describe such a case is to decide it," as
"[p]ublic morals, public justice, and the well established principles of all judicial
tribunals, alike forbid the interposition of courts of justice to lend their aid to
purposes like this." 61 The Bartle Court understood political corruption in a
different sense than that imagined by Justice Kennedy, although Justice Kennedy
would probably also find the contract at issue in Bartle to be corrupt. A public
officer used his position of public trust for private gain. The corrupt officer
described here was the quartermaster, who initiated the effort to use his position
to get a government contract. However, no particular crime was charged, and, in
fact, it does not appear that there was a criminal law against defrauding the
government at the time. Although the case does not detail all the elements, it
seems likely that there were legal and illegal elements to the initial contract. Yet
the illegality of the contract's subject matter was not central to the decision. 62 By
contrast, modern invocations of the public policy exception to invalidate
contracts invariably cite to criminalizing legislation as the reason for
nonenforcement.
It is worth noting the specific moral outrage present in the opinion,
particularly as it includes a component important to contract law at the time. The
violation at issue was not a technical one, but a civic one, which greatly angered
the Court. The Court described the action in moral 'terms, with a strong
condemnation that goes beyond the description of the action:
Public morals, public justice, and the well established principles of all
judicial tribunals, alike forbid the interposition of courts of justice to
lend their aid to purposes like this. To enforce a contract which began
with the corruption of a public officer, and progressed in the practice of
known and wilful deception in its execution, can never be consummated
or sanctioned by any court. 63
The Court treated this case as an easy one. It did not analyze criminal legal
statutes, but took for granted that it had the authority to determine that the
behavior was inappropriate.
The Bartle Court concluded that it would not "degrade itself' by aiding
these corrupt characters, but would leave them as they found them.64 This
language is important, because it puts contract law-private law-in a different
59. Id. at 189.
60. Id at 184.
61. Id at 188.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id. at 189.
b1iaws&SidiabChtgfiv
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relationship to public morals and democratic design than is typically assumed in
modem law. Law is an agent that can or cannot be used, and the Court imagines
that it is possible for courts to refuse to serve particular ends, but to leave them
to private enforcement.
Bartle is important for two major reasons. First, it supports the premise that
public morals can and should be considered in cases involving contracts between
private parties. While modem law tends to treat public and private law as
discrete categories, the Court here clearly saw its role in determining a private
contract to be public-focused. Second, it supports the notion that the judiciary
plays an active, subsidizing role when it chooses to enforce a contract, as public
resources are used to enable private wealth creation via courts. As such, the
judiciary should not lend its aid to schemes that involve defrauding the
government. 65 Morals and justice "forbid the interposition of courts of justice to
lend their aid to purposes like this." 66 The Court concluded that, in cases such as
Bartle, it ought to leave the parties as it found them; 67 if inequities exist, then it
is not the Court's task to determine who among the culpable parties is more or
less culpable.
No precise line divides public and private law. 68 However, the terms are
used and understood to circumscribe different realms generally and, in the
modem era, the spheres are treated as more distinct. Sometimes they are divided
by who has standing, by who is affected, or by the subject matter of the
dispute. 69 In the classic contemporary formulation, private law governs the
relationship between individuals and entities, while public law governs the
relationship between individuals and the state. 70 Private law is a set of rules that
governs behavior between relatively autonomous actors, who are assumed to be
educated, willing to negotiate, and free to negotiate. While private law is
enforced by public agents-such as police, officers, and courts-there is a
general understanding that its scope is limited to the private realm. Private law is
the law of contracts and torts; public law is criminal law and constitutional law.
Corporate law is private law; election law is public law.
The public/private distinction is an ancient divide, going back to Roman
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between
public and private law).
69. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law Distinction,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 267, 267-68 (1986) (arguing that private law and public law can be
distinguished on the basis of four factors: "1) the kinds of substantive standards used to assess the
types of conduct that may properly be subject to legal regulation; (2) the different status of persons
or entities that may properly complain about violations of legal regulation; (3) the different status
of persons or entities that are subject to legal regulation; (4) the different kinds of institutions that
may be charged with adjudicating and enforcing legal regulations").
70. See id. at 270.
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law. 71 However, the scope and clarity of the division has not been consistent. 72
Contract law is now understood as falling neatly within the realm of private
law. 73 While it has public dimensions, particular contracts are not examined to
determine whether they threaten the relationship between individuals and the
government. Yet, as Bartle demonstrates, in the past, the private law of contracts
could also be understood as being public-facing and regulating the relationship
between individuals and the state. 74 Law in its very nature was public, and so
every agent of the court, constrained by precedent, was to consider the public
effects of enforcement. The choice to enforce a contract was itself a public
action.
This nineteenth century conception of contract enforcement as a public
action is technically true in the most basic sense: the cost of enforcing a contract
is paid for by publicly-collected tax dollars, which fund the construction of court
houses and the salaries of police officers, court clerks, and judges. But it is also
true in a more abstract sense-the law, including the law of contracts, is a public
creation open to public debate. 75 Law is not a priori and does not exist in the
abstract; law exists because it continues to be chosen by the public as the best
method for securing our collective public good. The use of public institutions to
enforce private contracts is a public subsidy for those contracts. 76
The courts' role in enforcing contracts can be understood in different ways.
The modem tendency is to imagine the courts as infrastructure that provide a
necessary service. However, one can imagine-as the Bartle court did-that it is
a subsidy to certain private actions. The Bartle Court imagined itself as actively
supporting or discouraging activities. It believed that "[t]o enforce a contract
which began with the corruption of a public officer, and progressed in the
practice of known and wilful deception in its execution, can never be
consummated or sanctioned by any court."77 A modem court might come to a
71. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 2 (1962).
72. See generally Kennedy, supra note 68 (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between
public and private law).
73. Barnett, supra note 69, at 270-71 ("Private law subjects would include contract, torts,
property, corporations, agency and partnership, trusts and estates, and remedies-subjects defining
the enforceable duties that all individuals owe to one another.").
74. There are many reasons for this change, including the rise of the regulatory state, which
limited certain capacities to contract through legislation, and so shifted the institutional role of
protecting public policy from the judiciary to the legislature. See generally GRANT GILMoRE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974),
75. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923).
76. Alan Chen, Meet the New Boss, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1253, 1267 (1996) ("The private law
realm exists only as a product of a public regime. The conception of contract and property law as
'private' has long been criticized. One fundamental argument that obliterates the distinction arises
from the fact that private law enforcement must come through the force of the state. The
boundaries of 'private' law are governed largely by common law rules, which are themselves
developed through paradigmatic state agents, the courts.")
77. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. 184, 188 (1830).
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similar conclusion as the Bartle court did, but the method it would have used to
get there is different.
Bartle v. Nutt illustrates an understanding of the judiciary as a subsidy to
business and to private arrangements. It is not so much that the Court withdrew
its support from corrupt behavior, as that it did not want to offer its support in
the first place. Moreover, it shows that public morals should be considered when
the Court is asked to rule on a contract between private parties.
C. Lobbying Is Against the Public Policy of the United States
Bartle v. Nutt is a curiosity, but it can be reconciled with modem law in
other ways. Contemporary courts might refuse to enforce the same contract
because they would find that federal statutes forbid such contracting, or because
of the underlying illegal nature of the enterprise. By contrast, Trist v. Child, an
1874 case in which the Supreme Court refused to enforce a basic contract to
lobby, is unimaginable today, as it directly conflicts with modem First
Amendment doctrine and the modem law of contracts.78 Its approach towards
the relationship between speech, power, money, and the judiciary is miles apart
from the approach of the contemporary Court.
The case arose out of N.P. Trist's claim that the United States owed him
money for helping to negotiate the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.79 However, by
the time Trist sought payment, he was too old and sick to travel to Washington
to try to convince Congress to pass a bill authorizing payment to him. 80 Instead,
he hired Linus Child, a Boston lawyer, to represent him. 81 Trist agreed to pay
Child a contingency fee-twenty-five percent of whatever he secured-and
nothing else. 82 When Congress eventually passed a bill calling for Trist to be
paid, Child sought twenty-five percent of the sum, as they had previously
agreed. 83 Trist refused to pay, prompting Child to file suit against him. 84
Child argued that his arrangement with Trist was like any attorney-client
relationship. 85 Unlike prior cases in which secret collusion was used to secure
government funding, "[e]very act of theirs was open, fair, and honorable." 86
Child's core argument was based on Trist's right to personally petition Congress:
if Trist had this right, he should have a right to hire an agent to petition on his
78. Compare Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441 (1874), with Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the
Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 149 (1993) (arguing that there is a presumptively strong First Amendment right to lobby).
79. Trist, 88 U.S. at 441.
80. Id. at 445.
81. Id. at 441-42.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 444 ("Here both father and son were openly and avowedly attorneys for their
client, Trist.").
86. Id. at 444.
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behalf. 87 As such, the agreement between Childs and Trist was simply a matter
of a normal contingency fee rather than a payment for corrupt lobbying. Child's
lawyer explicitly distanced his client from self-interested influence peddling,88
arguing, "We are not here asking the court to open the door to corrupt influences
upon Congress, or give aid to that which popularly known as 'lobbying,' and is
properly denounced as dishonorable." 89 Instead of arguing that lobbying was
protected, he argued that he wasn't lobbying.
The Court rejected these arguments, holding that while an individual can
petition Congress on her own behalf to pass a bill granting payment of a private
claim, they cannot pay a third party to do so.90 The Court placed its logic within
the long history of common law cases that hold that contracts against public
policy are void.91 The contract between Trist and Child was "if not corrupt, . . .
illegitimate, and considered in connection with the pecuniary interest of the
agent at stake, contrary to the plainest principles of public policy." 92 The Court
did not rest its conclusion upon the fact of the contingent fees but based its
arguments instead upon the illegitimacy of paid political petitioning.93 The
Court grounded its opinion in two features of corruption that do not appear in
Citizens United: 1) that anyone could be corrupted,94 and 2) citing Montesquieu,
that moral failure-not bribery, which was not at issue in the case-threatened
society. 95 The Court never explicitly states what it means by corruption or the
threat of corruption. However, it suggests that a Congressperson selling
influence would be corrupt and, moreover, that a widespread practice of paying
for influence would undermine the integrity of the entire political system. 96
Citizens' virtue is the "foundation of a republic," the Court explained. 97
Citizens have an important public office to fill, as "[t]hey are at once sovereigns
and subjects." 98 While public servants are obliged to be "animated in the
discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice, and the public
good," citizens have a "correlative duty" to "exhibit truth, frankness, and
87. Id. at 444-45.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 445.
90. See id. at 451 (stating that the law forbids "the sale of the influence and exertions of the
lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private claim").
91. Id. at 449 (citing state cases).
92. Id. at 451.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 451 ("No one has a right, in such circumstances, to put himself in a position of
temptation to do what is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law forbids the inchoate
step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the undertaking.").
95. Id. at 450 ("The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at once
sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is weakened. When it is
destroyed, the fabric must fall. Such is the voice of universal history." (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748))).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 450.
98. Id.
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integrity" in their conversations "with those in authority." 99 According to the
Court, "[a]ny departure from the line of rectitude in such cases, is not only bad in
morals, but involves a public wrong."100 The language here reflects a view of
corruption that is worlds apart from Justice Kennedy's quid pro quo approach.
Because citizens' virtue is so vital, the Court suggested that people do not have a
right to put themselves in a position where they would be tempted to offer a
bribe. Lobbying, according to the Court, is the first step towards bribery and, the
Court holds, the "law forbids the inchoate step." 10 Moreover, the Court
suggests that, while an individual instance of lobbying may seem benign, if an
individual is allowed to lobby, then everyone would be allowed to lobby. And if
everyone is allowed to lobby, then corporations would be allowed to lobby. The
Court almost takes for granted that corporate lobbying would be impermissible:
If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adventurers
who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of a
general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the
moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce
the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the
employment as infamous. 102
The Court was not precise about the particular harm imagined. Is it that money
would have too great an impact? Is it inequality? Is it civic culture? Its
conviction of the harm and danger is so ingrained that it need not be explicitly
described. However, in context, it appears that the Court may have been
concerned about a combination of all three, with a focus on the civic culture of a
society. The Court seems to have been concerned that widespread lobbying will
erode confidence in the legitimacy of representative government. 103 You can see
this in the Court's reference to Montesquieu, the focus on citizenship, and the
moral language. The Court emphasized public morality, arguing that "[i]f the
instances [of lobbying] were numerous, open, and tolerated, they would be
regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the
times." 104 The private act is measured not by its impact on the parties in the
case, or on future parties in similar cases, but by its impact on society and
democratic culture.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 451. The language of "temptation" is particularly interesting here because it
echoes the founding era interest in temptation: the crafters of the Constitution wanted not only to
protect against bribery but also the temptation to bribe. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anticorruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 341, 347 (2009).
102. Trist, 88 U.S. at 451.
103. This sentiment is an early precursor to the idea in Buckley that not only corruption, but
the appearance of corruption, causes significant democratic erosion. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (finding that avoiding the appearance of corruption is a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify government restriction of speech).
104. Trist, 88 U.S. at 451.
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Finally, the Court argued that there is no clear way to distinguish between
private pleas to Congress and demands for more broad-sweeping legislation. It
assumed without argument that lobbying for general legislation must be
condemned and focused instead on the problems presented by lobbying for
small, private bills. Because small private bills are not known by the public, and
the discussions around the bills are often "whispered," advocacy for private bills
creates huge opportunities for advocates to induce legislators to support these
bills for the wrong reasons, and, again, for bribery.10 5 Instead of engaging in
objective fact-finding, "[t]hose whose duty it is to investigate" hear unsupported
facts by self-interested parties; 106 without a check on the facts communicated by
the self-interested parties, legislators may simply rubberstamp the bill.
The Court dwelled not on preventing wrongdoing, but on limiting
temptation. In this view, one of the jobs of the courts is to keep a solid
foundation in the halls of Congress. In effect, the Court saw its job as protecting
political culture:
To legalize the traffic of such service, would open a door at which fraud
and falsehood would not fail to enter and make themselves felt at every
accessible point. It would invite their presence and offer them a
premium. If the tempted agent be corrupt himself, and disposed to
corrupt others, the transition requires but a single step. 107
If lobbying were legal, the Court suggested, everyone would be tempted to
engage in it. A permissive attitude towards legal lobbying could lead to more
opportunities for bribes. While not all lobbying might be wrong, the culture of
lobbying would weaken civic culture. The Court did not suggest that lobbying
does not occur or that bribery does not already occur. Instead, it assumed that
both are commonplace, which creates all the more reason to not legally sanction
it. 108
Trist was neither bizarre nor unique for its time. 109 Its lack of
remarkableness is itself worthy of contemporary study because it exhibits a
105. Id. at 451.
106. Id.
107. Id. at451-52.
108. See id at 452 ("The widespread suspicion which prevails, and charges openly made and
hardly denied, lead to the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence.").
109. Its unremarkableness is shown by the fact that little was made of the case at the time,
and that it both cited, and was cited by, dozens of other cases. See, e.g., McGehee v. Lindsay, 6
Ala. 16 (1844) (refusing to enforce a public contract in which a state-employed supervisor had an
interest). The court talked about how no man can serve two masters with conflicting interests.
Doing so creates "a temptation perhaps . . . too strong for resistance by men of flexible morals, or
hacknied in the common devices of worldly business, . . . which would betray them into gross
misconduct, and even crime." Id. at 20. The court focused on creating structures where temptations
do not enter in for men with "flexible* morals" or who are steeped in the usual run of business
behavior. In fact, the Alabama Court quite explicitly did not suggest that immoral activity came
into play here, or that there was bribery or an incorrect price. Instead it found that there was a
policy of not enforcing these contracts as a "preventive check against such temptations and
seductions." Id.
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different attitude towards the courts' obligation to uphold civic culture than
current courts display. Today, courts and many academics not only tolerate but
celebrate paid lobbying. They see it as a fundamental First Amendment right,
and a necessary part of the legislative process.110 But Trist shows that this was
not always the general view. According to the Trist Court, lobbying is
presumptively corruptive. The Court understands corruption to include a broad
range of activities, and it recognizes that its obligation to prevent it is equally
broad.
While the Court in Trist and Citizens United rely on different logic, and
come to different conclusions, the question underlying each case is similar. Laws
that once restricted lobbying are similar to laws that once restricted independent
corporate expenditure. Both were designed to limit how much money can be
spent to distort democratic desires. They both implicated speech rights. Both
were designed to limit inappropriate dependencies in government. Both paid
lobbying and campaign donations allow companies or individuals with amassed
wealth to have disproportionate political power in a society.
Between Trist and Citizens United, there is no question that the Supreme
Court narrowed its view of corruption substantially; it also narrowed its
understanding of its own duty to protect democratic integrity. In Trist, an
essential job of any court is to limit corruption and the appearance of corruption;
in Citizens United, this job is seen as more secondary and technical. Moreover,
Trist demonstrates that contract law, rather than criminal law, can be used to
deter corruption.
D. The Post Office and the Public Good
Like Trist, Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary,111 is also fairly typical of the
cases of the time. In the late 1800s, the federal postmasters had to use part of
their salary to pay for the building where they would accept and distribute mail
for the town. 112 Because post offices were the center of public traffic at the time,
110. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together,
19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 105, 107 (2008) ("Both lobbying and campaign finance are vital to
representative democracy. Lobbying helps elected officials obtain the information they need to
develop legislative or regulatory initiatives; to assess how proposals for government action will
affect specific interests, industries, constituencies, or society at large; to determine how different
groups view particular policy alternatives; and to decide how they will vote on the measures that
come before them."); Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9 (2006) ("Though widely vilified, lobbyists representing
individuals or groups can make a valuable contribution to informed and effective government.
Lobbyists can direct ideas and opinions to appropriate decision makers and clearly express the
views of citizens who have too little time or skill to do so personally. Lobbyists also illuminate the
practical consequences of proposed government conduct by ensuring that the insights and
professional expertise of a particular business or industry become part of the deliberative
process.").
111. Elkhart Cnty. Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238 (1884).
112. Id at 239.
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the location of a post office would have a huge impact on the success of nearby
establishments. 113 In Elkhardt County, Indiana, the room used as a post office
was getting a little run down, so the government started looking for a new place
to put a post office. 114 Two different groups of businessmen wanted the post
office near their businesses. 115 A brick building, under construction, seemed
ideal for the post office, and certainly ideal for one of the competing business
groups. 116 The owners of the brick building approached nearby property owners
and proposed that they would offer a room in the building for nominal rent to the
government in return for a yearly payment from the local businessmen. 117
Additionally, the owner of the brick building, who was a personal friend of the
postmaster, would suggest to the postmaster that the building was a good
location.118 The proposed contract was for ten years. 119 In essence, one private
party paid another private party to use his powers of personal persuasion to
convince a federal official to select a particular location for a building.
After a dispute, the building owners did not want to keep paying the annual
installments. They argued that the "consideration" given in exchange for the
promised money was illegal, and that the contract was void for being against
public policy.
The Supreme Court of Indiana agreed, holding that "contracts which tend to
improperly influence those engaged in the public service, or which tend to
subordinate the public welfare to individual gain, are not enforceable in any
court of justice." 120 The court's reasoning depends upon the idea that there is
something tangible called "the public welfare." If there is no "public welfare,"
but only competing private interests, then subordination becomes an
unintelligible idea. Because there is a public welfare, it is the responsibility of
law to protect it and to shape the public good, not to harm it.
In the court's view, "personal influence ... is not a vendible article in our
system of laws and morals, and the courts of the United States will not lend their
aid to the vendor to collect the price of the article."1 21 In so finding, the court
appears to veer into property law, where the bounds of alienability are created. In
close cases, questions of what is and is not alienable always come down to a
public policy discussion-policy creates the nature of property. The policy, in
this case, is the policy expressed above-that sale of personal influence would
harm the public good. Yet there is an implicit strain in this discussion that the
113. See id. ("The value of adjacent property was enhanced by the location of the post-office
and its rental value increased.").
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id at 239-40.
119. Id.
120. Id at 241.
121. Id at 244.
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recognition of personal influence as a transferrable, sellable thing would itself
diminish the person who holds that influence. In effect, the court concluded that
''personal influence" is a good that any individual can use on their own but that
cannot be sold. This is a fascinating analogy, of course, because it makes
"personal influence" in the conduct of public affairs something very much like
the vote, sexual affection, or bodily organs-a good that is fundamentally
inalienable in the eyes of the law. Some of these prohibitions exist in statutory
law, but some are found in the common law that has developed in response to
particular public policy arguments, such as where courts consistently refuse to
enforce contracts for prostitution, 122 or contracts that encourage divorce. 123
The Elkhart County Lodge court's analogy thus indicates a different
understanding of the role of courts in defining the bounds of what we can and
cannot do with property, and in contract. The case reveals that courts at the time
were willing to use contract law to make decisions about the shape of political
life. In effect, the court was doing what many statutes now do-trying to limit
public corruption-but doing it through contract law.
E. A Constitutional Law of Corruption?
At the same time that state and federal courts quietly enshrined the private
law of corruption, the U.S. Supreme Court also recognized something related,
but slightly different, in Ex Parte Yarbough.124 Although Yarbough is best
known as a landmark civil rights case, the case also discusses corruption in a
way that I think is likely representative of how courts thought about corruption at
the time. It reveals that nineteenth century courts thought about corruption as a
deep and fundamental (and arguably constitutional) threat.
In Yarbough, several members of the Ku Klux Klan threatened and beat a
black man in order to intimidate him out of voting. 125 After they were convicted
for conspiracy to violate federal laws, they brought a writ of habeas corpus
against the warden in the prison they where were held, claiming that the laws
they were punished under were invalid and unconstitutional. 126 The defendants
argued that the federal government had no authority to prosecute them, as there
was no constitutional text giving the federal government the power to regulate
this kind of crime. 127
The Court's response was impassioned. According to the Court, the
temptation to subvert elections through "violence and . .. corruption" is a
122. Cf Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual
Unconscionability, 96 IowA L. REv. 1177, 1224 (2011) (implying that a contract for prostitution is
"an extreme case of a contract that no state would recognize as enforceable-an illegal bargain").
123. Williston on Contracts, § 16:19 (4th ed. 2011).
124. Ex Parte Yarbough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
125. Id. at 657.
126. Id. at 653-54.
127. Id. at 658.
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constant source of danger; "[s]uch has been the history of all republics."' 28 The
Court refused to entertain the argument that combating corruption would exceed
the state's constitutional grant of power, rejecting this possibility as "so startling
as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration."1 29 The very fact of
government, it concluded, implies the capacity to enact and prosecute laws
protecting the integrity of that government. 130 Without such ability, the
government is at great risk:
If the government of the United States has within its constitutional
domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very sources of
power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and
outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the country in danger,
and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires,
and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of the combinations of
those who respect no right but brute force, on the one hand, and
unprincipled corruptionists on the other. 131
The Court further argued that republican, elected governments have a uniquely
strong implied right to combat corruption: "If it has not this power it is left
helpless before the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open
violence and insidious corruption."' 32 Congress thus had the power to limit
corruption based solely on its power to protect itself: because the government is
fundamentally fragile, great vigilance is needed.
Staying within the four walls of the opinion, the Court appears to take a
broad view of corruption and to consider the intimidation of voters a form of
corruption. This view is interesting because it suggests that the Court considered
the dissuasion of a citizen from performing his civic duties akin to the dissuasion
of, say, a judge from performing his civic duties. Much as one might say that a
person who threatens a judge corrupts the system, a person who threatens a
citizen performing his citizenship activities threatens the system.
While Yarbough is not a contract case, it expresses the same view seen
throughout the other cases-that corruption is a broad problem, and that courts
have a special responsibility to respond to it and protect against it.
128. Id at 666-67.
129. Id at 657.
130. See id. at 657-58 ("That a government whose essential character is republican, whose
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose numerous and powerful branch of the
legislature is elected by the people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition so startling as
to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration. If this government is anything more than
a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other states and governments, each of which is superior
to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence
depends, from violence and corruption.").
131. Id at 667.
132. Id. at 658.
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F. Conclusion
In each of the four cases discussed above, the reason for refusing to enforce
the contract was not an underlying statute that made the behavior illegal, but
concern that the contract (or behavior, in the case of Yarbough) was corrupt. In
each case, the ruling court adopted a broad view of corruption that encompassed
notions of civic duty as well as simply quid pro quo corruption. A review of
dozens of contract law cases from the period suggests that these cases are
representative of the treatment of these issues during the period. While a much
deeper and more thorough (and longer term) study would be required to stitch all
of the nineteenth century contract cases together, this initial study at least
suggests a different approach. They are evidence that courts frequently refused to
enforce contracts that undermined the integrity of the political process.
IV.
WHY NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTRACT LAW MATTERS IN LIGHT OF CITIZENS
UNITED
These historical authorities are important in their own right because they
provide a richer understanding of the history of both contract law and corruption
law. However, they have special resonance in light of Kennedy's opinion in
Citizens United. First, they undermine the notion that courts have always had a
narrow view of corruption. Second, they suggest that contract law might provide
an intriguing avenue for experimentation.
A. Corruption Redefined
A key feature of Kennedy's decision was his argument that Austin's broad
definition of corruption was an outlier. He referred to the cases as pre-Austin and
post-Austin and emphasized the singularity of the Austin opinion.133 And he
described Austin as uniquely giving weight to the governmental interest in
prohibiting aggregated wealth from unduly influencing politics.134
I have argued elsewhere that corruption is a fundamental constitutional
concern that is given far too little deference by the modem Supreme Court. 135
Corruption was the Founders' paramount concern when drafting the
Constitution. By the terms of the debate in Philadelphia and the terms the
Founders used to describe the Constitution's purpose, limiting corruption was
the most important goal of the convention. 136 The Constitution was drafted with
the purpose of limiting corruption in the new republic; it was the paramount
133. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
134. See id. (noting that the government had raised these arguments in cases prior to Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and that the Court did not adopt that
reasoning).
135. See generally Teachout, supra note 101.
136. Id. at 346-73.
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concern that drove hundreds of drafting decisions in the summer the Constitution
was written. It was, according to various accounts by Founders as diverse as
Madison, Hamilton, Washington, and Franklin, the primary motivation behind
the Constitution's final form. 137 Moreover, their understanding of corruption
was not cash-for-votes, but conduct which used public channels for private gain
and created a situation where public officials were fundamentally dependent
upon private cash flows. I argued that the judicial branch ought to recognize an
"anti-corruption" principle, akin to federalism or the separation of powers, that
would guide constitutional decision-making.1 38
My previous Article ended when the Constitutional Convention ended.
However, as I demonstrated in the previous Part, if one extends the historical
inquiry into the nineteenth century, at least some courts understood corruption
far more broadly than Justice Kennedy. Corruption, under this line of cases,
referred to personal failures that posed structural threats to democracy, often
caused by inappropriate dependencies.
Justice Kennedy concluded that improper influence is not corruption, and
that the appearance of influence would not lead to perceptions of corruption. 139
Yet this view is in direct conflict with decades of nineteenth century and early
twentieth century precedent, as well as Austin. For example, in refusing to
enforce a contract in 1920, the Nevada Supreme Court explicitly held that a
contract need not be illegal, and the actors involved need not have a corrupt
motive, if the overall effect of similar contracts would be to allow people to
"assum[e] a position where selfish motives may impel them to sacrifice the
public good to private benefit."1 40
Similarly, while Kennedy concluded that only direct quid pro quo is corrupt,
nineteenth century courts routinely concluded that quid pro quo was not required
in each instance, although they recognized the "corrupting tendencies of such
contracts."1 4 1 They recognized that the definition was not pat or simple, but that
the lack of simplicity did not relieve courts of the responsibility of trying to
define it. Courts thus had little difficulty in talking about corruption in a way that
included almost any effort to use money to put private interests before public
interests in what they perceived to be fundamentally public-facing decisions. 142
137. Id. See also Notes of James Madison (Aug. 14, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 282, 288 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1937) ("What led to
the appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of
the States.") (recording arguments of Mercer).
138. Id. at 342.
139. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
140. King v. Randall, 190 P. 979, 981 (Nev. 1920). In that case, the court found that a
building contract based on the consideration of the location of a courthouse for a private benefit
was unenforceable as it interfered with the public interest in the location of the courthouse.
141. Hare v. Phaup 101 P. 1050, 1052 (Okla. 1909); Davis v. Janeway, 155 P. 241,
243 (Okla. 1916).
142. For example, in an extensive discussion from a Delaware court (in the context of a
criminal charge that an election officer refused to allow someone to vote for corrupt reasons), that
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If one peels back history and looks at cases from the nineteenth century,
Austin feels more mainstream, and the quid pro quo references in Buckley and
Citizens United look more like an outlier. At the very least, courts seem to have
long struggled with the difficulty of defining corruption in tractable terms, but
they do not appear to have reached a long-standing consensus that corruption is
limited to quidpro quo exchanges. 143
B. A Modern Law of Contract Enforcement?
A second reason the nineteenth century laws might matter is that they
provide a precedent for the use-or withholding-of the state's power to enforce
contracts to dissuade corporate powers from exploiting weaknesses in the
electoral machinery for private ends. After all, courts' doctrine of refusing to
enforce contracts on broad political corruption grounds never died, exactly; it
was just slowly whittled away as American courts become much more skeptical
of the public policy exception. 1" Thus, as of 2010, the public policy doctrine
still exists. The current Restatement of Contracts, for instance, states that "[a]
promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms."l 45
More importantly, the Supreme Court, while very stem towards criminal
sanctions, 146 has been less stem regarding the legislative branch's use of
noncriminal powers to dissuade certain kinds of political speech. It has held that
Congress may withhold otherwise available subsidies to avoid facilitating
lobbying, such as by refusing to give charitable organizations that engage in
lobbying tax-exempt status. 147 In conditioning tax-exempt status on a
court quoted from an earlier Delaware case:
It is difficult to define corruption, but we may say that it is the willfully and corruptly
doing an act or omitting a duty which a person, acting in a public capacity, knows it to
be his duty to do or omit, in disregard of his official duty, and the obligations of his
oath.
State v. Colton, 33 A. 259, 260 (Del. 1891) (quoting State v. Porter, 4 Del. 556, 557 (1845)).
143. Of course, Kennedy's characterization of Austin as an unruly outlier that needs to be
tamed is weak even if one looks only at the modem jurisprudence. See Hasen, supra note 24, at
601.
144. Pettit, supra note 46, at 325. Cf Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1916)
(finding that there was "an obvious departure from recognized legal and moral standards" where a
company employed an agent with "compensation contingent upon success, to secure the contract
for furnishing . . . satchels" to the federal government. Because of their baneful tendency ...
[such] agreements . . . are deemed inconsistent with sound morals and public policy, and therefore
invalid").
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
146. See discussion supra Part II.
147. Fed. Comm. Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (Congress can
"reasonably refuse to subsidize the lobbying activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by
prohibiting such organizations from using tax-deductible contributions to support their lobbying
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commitment not to lobby, "Congress has not infringed any First Amendment
rights or regulated any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen
not to pay for .. . lobbying."' 48 By an extension of that same logic, a statutory
rule that restricted courts ability to enforce contracts to lobby might be slightly
more likely to survive a First Amendment challenge. A commitment to enforce
contracts is not free-it is meaningful, costly, material support for those who use
it. So Congress would not be criminalizing electioneering-it would simply be
refusing to subsidize it, a distinction with potential constitutional significance.
This could play out in many different ways, but one could imagine, for example,
the state of Vermont passing a law that said that Vermont courts could not
enforce contracts by corporations that contracted with a film production
company to make electioneering television ads designed to defeat a particular
candidate for office (or tracking the part of BCRA that was struck down in
Citizens United). This would make corporations less likely to engage in this
kind of electioneering because if something went wrong, they couldn't go to the
courts to sue for breach.
By turning to contract law, instead of criminal law, the state might soften
these direct attacks on prior efforts to limit corruption using criminal sanctions.
More importantly, it would send a strong signal that the courts are fundamentally
public spaces, publicly funded, and they should not be used to enforce contracts
that do, in fact, undermine the fundamentally public nature of our democracy.
V.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Citizens United purported to close the debate about
corruption in campaign finance law. However, it left open a few opportunities
for greater exploration. The ad hoc nineteenth century practice of refusing to
enforce contracts to sell public obligations provides an intriguing possibility for
exploration. In the nineteenth century, courts used contract law to discourage
public corruption, and they would sometimes refuse to enforce contracts that
they deemed corrupt. Just as they would refuse to enforce contracts for
prostitution, they would refuse to enforce contracts between public servants and
private entities that undermined the integrity of representative government. In
the most striking instance of this practice, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
enforce a contract to lobby Congress, holding that it was a corrupt practice and
against the public policy of the United States.
These cases challenge Kennedy's view that Austin was an outlier. They
show that there is a long history of cases that recognize that undue influence
could constitute corruption and create the appearance of corruption. They also
efforts." (citing Regan v. Taxation of Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540(1983))).
148. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
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open the imagination to new ways of preventing corruption. In the modem
framework, contract law is rarely considered as a possible tool to discourage
political corruption and political dependence on concentrated financial power.
The nineteenth century contract law of corruption suggests that we might
fruitfully explore the structure of contract enforcement, and reminds us that
courts can never be neutral in their relationship to corruption. The stability and
certainty declared by Justice Kennedy is fundamentally elusive; we must always
engage in a more searching, difficult, textured understanding of the way the legal
system discourages and encourages relationships between institutions, people,
money, and power.
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